Industrial Cluster, Similarity, and External Economies by CAO, Zhan & CHEN, Qian
 ISSN 1712-8358[Print]
ISSN 1923-6700[Online]
   www.cscanada.net
www.cscanada.org
Cross-Cultural Communication
Vol. 11, No. 1, 2015, pp. 100-103
DOI: 10.3968/6358
100Copyright © Canadian Academy of Oriental and Occidental Culture
Industrial Cluster, Similarity, and External Economies
CAO Zhan[a],*; CHEN Qian[a]
[a]Xinhua College of Sun Yat-Sen University, Guangzhou, China.
*Corresponding author. 
Received 15 October 2014; accepted 12 December 2014
Published online 26 January 2015
Abstract
This paper develops a simple model in which external 
economies are caused by interconnectedness among 
firms in intracluster and intercluster. Two main results are 
developed. First, the larger the elasticity of substitution 
between any two products produced within the cluster, 
the larger the cluster’s output; second, a cluster with 
larger elasticity of substitution yields larger output among 
different clusters other things being equal.
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INTRODUCTION
It has been widely known that industrial clusters provide 
an explanation of scale economics at the level of the 
industries (Porter, 1998). The analysis of external 
economies goes back to Marshall (1920). Along this line 
of argument, Fujita et al. (2001) focus that a cluster is a 
key feature of urbanization. Indeed, the industrialization 
process in Italy and East Asian countries and regions 
nearly follow the Marshallian industrial district model 
(Becattini, 1990). Another pattern of industrialization 
in the U.S and UK fits into the hub-and-spoke model 
(Chander, 1977; Landes, 1998). Cheryl et al. (2012) 
propose that the  industrialization process in China is 
largely cluster-based phenomenon in which numerous 
highly interconnected firms are located within a well-
defined geographic region.
However the mechanisms through which clustering 
affects firm growth remain to be explored (Cheryl et al., 
2012). In particular, this paper is concerned with product 
similarity which leads to cluster growth. 
Rainer et al. (2000) propose that when two countries 
start from the same initial conditions, the one with the 
higher elasticity of substitution will experience a higher 
income per bead, other things being equal. So in the 
paper product similarity is measured with the elasticity of 
substitution.
In this paper, there are two important points to be 
emphasized. Firstly, I shall adopt the assumption proposed 
by Porter (1998) that clusters are critical to competition. 
So it is natural to use monopolistic competition model to 
solve the cluster issue, as Krugman (1991) did. Secondly, 
the similarity of products is used as a proxy of the 
interconnectedness of firms. 
This paper develops a simple model in which external 
economies are caused by interconnectedness among 
firms in a cluster(s) which is defined as geographic 
concentrations of interconnected companies and 
institutions in a particular field (Porter, 1998). The 
approach differs from that of most formal treatments of 
scale economics, which assume that scale economies 
are external to firms. Instead, external economies are 
here assumed to be interconnectedness among firms in a 
cluster(s), with the market structure that comes forth being 
one of Chamberlinian monopolistic competition (Negishi 
et al., 1969). The formal treatment of monopolistic 
competition is borrowed with slight modifications from 
the work by Dixit and Stiglitz (1977).
1.  CLUSTER, INTERCONNECTEDNESS, 
AND SIMILARITY
1.1.  Concept of Similarity
There has been much discussion of nature of the 
externalities. Marshall (1920) proposed that there are 
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three main reasons, which continue to be valid today, 
why a cluster of firms might be more efficient than an 
individual firm in isolation: specialized suppliers, labor 
market pooling, and knowledge spillovers. However, in 
this paper, instead of asking why a particular cluster is 
concentrated in a particular area, I shall ask why some 
clusters are larger than other clusters. The proposed 
explanation correspondingly concentrates on generalized 
external economies rather than those specific to a 
particular cluster. Especially, this paper is concerned with 
cluster similarity which leads to cluster growth.
This paper uses cluster similarity to measure 
interconnectedness among firms. 
Porter (1998) proposes that other things being 
equal, the larger cluster in production will be those 
with relatively large interconnectedness, since the 
interconnectedness promotes both competition and 
cooperation. On the issue,
Porter (2000) states that firms in a cluster share the 
same providers of specialized infrastructure as well 
as suppliers of specialized inputs such as machinery, 
components, and services. Moreover, Porter suggests 
that geographically concentrated clusters cause one main 
benefit which industries in the same cluster share common 
inputs, institutions, skills, technologies, and knowledge. 
1.2  Intra-Cluster Relation
One follows the above train of thought. If firms and 
industries produce similar commodities, it is more 
possible for them to rely on the same set of clients and 
suppliers, and for them to use similar combinations of 
inputs in their production, and thus they are more likely to 
be interconnected through technologies, skills, and other 
common inputs. So according to Porter’s definition, the 
similarity among products can be used as a measure for 
interconnectedness among firms. 
Especially, in this paper the elasticity of substitution 
between any two products within a cluster is used as 
a measure of interconnectedness for cluster similarity. 
The interconnectedness is concerned with the relation 
among firms in a cluster (intra-cluster relation). Cheryl 
et al.( 2012) also uses a similar concept to measure 
the interconnectedness in a cluster. Another kind of 
interconnectedness is inter-cluster relation.
 
2.  MONOPOLISTIC COMPETITION IN A 
CLOSED ECONOMY
This section develops the basic model of monopolistic 
competition which will be used in the next section. The 
model is a simplified version of the model proposed by 
Dixit and Stiglitz (1977). Instead of developing a general 
model, this paper will assume particular forms for cost 
and utility functions. 
Consider, a cluster in an economy is assumed to be 
able to produce any of amounts of commodities, with 
the commodities indexed by i. This paper orders the 
commodities so that those actually produced range from 
1 to n, where n is assumed to be amounts number, though 
small relative to the amounts of potential products. 
This paper will aggregate the rest of the economy into 
one commodity labeled 0, chosen as the numeraire and 
normalized at unity. Writing the amounts of the various 
commodities as x0 and x=(x1, x2, …), all residents are 
assumed to share the same utility function with convex 
indifference surfaces. The utility function in this section 
is 
                       U=U(x0,{∑
i
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ρ
}1/ρ) . (1)
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where I is income in terms of the numeraire and pi is 
prices of the commodities being produced.
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Where β=(1-ρ)/ρ, which is positive because 0<ρ<1. 
Then in the first stage1 of a two-stage budgeting procedure
  Y=Is(q)/q ,    x=I(1-s(q)) . (4)
In the second stage of the problem, for each i
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since this paper assumes n fairly large, the effect of each 
pi on q is neglected. This leaves the elasticity
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From Equation (5), one obverses that for i≠j,
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Therefore the elasticity of substitution between any 
two products within the cluster is
          γ=1/(1-ρ)>1  (0<ρ<1) .     (9)
Consider a symmetric situation where pi=p and xi=x for 
all i. Then
 (10)
Now consider profit-maximizing pricing behavior, 
since n>>1, each individual firm can ignore the effects of 
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its decisions on the decisions of other firms. Therefore the 
ith firm will choose its price to maximize its profits, 
   , (11)
where c is the common marginal cost. Profits will be 
driven to zero by entry of new firms. 
3.  INDUSTRY PROXIMITY AND SCALE 
OF CLUSTER
3.1  Intra-Cluster Relation
The profit-maximization condition for each firm to act 
on its own is the equality of marginal cost and marginal 
revenue.      
Writing pe for the common equilibrium price for each 
variety being produced, and from Equation (7)
pe[1-(1-ρ)]=c.
From Equation (9)
 1-γ
γcpe =  ,
then  . (12)
The theory of external economies (Krugman, 2009) 
suggests that when external economies are important, 
a country with a large cluster will be more efficient in 
that cluster than a country with a small cluster other 
things being equal. Therefore external economies can be 
represented by assuming that when a cluster’s costs are 
lower, the larger the cluster. This means that the cluster 
will have a forward-falling supply curve: The larger the 
cluster’s output, the lower the price at which firms are 
ready to sell their output. Then
    . (13)
From Equations  (12) and (13)
        
 .
 (14)
The larger the elasticity of substitution between any 
two products produced within the cluster, the larger the 
cluster’s output other things being equal.
3.2  Inter-Cluster Relation
Assume that there are two clusters of commodities beside 
the numeraire, the two being perfect substitutes for each 
other. Each cluster consists of a large number of products 
produced by firms among the clusters-cluster 1 and cluster 
2-themselves playing symmetric roles. All individuals will 
have the convenient utility function
. (15)
This paper assumes that each firm in group i has the 
same fixed cost a and the same constant marginal cost c.
Specially, consider only one good group being 
produced in each. The equilibria are given by
       (16)
   . (17)
If and only if one does not pay a firm to produce 
a good of the second cluster, Equation (16) is a Nash 
equilibrium. The demand for such a good is 
.
Conditions:
      . (18)
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Similarly, Equation (17) is a Nash equilibrium if and 
only if 
    . (19)
Figure 1 is drawn to depict the possible equilibria. 
Then Equations (18) and (19) tell us whether either 
or both of the situations are possible equilibria. Now 
consider the region or region B, both Equation (16) and 
Equation (17) are Nash equilibria,
.
From Equation (14), .
If γ1>γ2, then >1 , (20)
Figure 1
Solution Labels I Refer to Equation (17); Solution 
Labels II Refer to Equation (18)
When both equation (16) and equation (17) are 
equilibria, a cluster with larger elasticity of substitution 
yields larger output among different clusters other things 
being equal.
CONCLUSION
This paper has constructed some models to study some 
aspects of the relationship between interconnectedness 
among firms in intracluster and intercluster and 
the externalities of clusters. The following general 
conclusions seem worth pointing out. First, the larger 
the elasticity of substitution between any two products 
produced within the cluster, the larger the cluster’s output 
other things being equal; second, a cluster with larger 
elasticity of substitution yields larger output among 
different clusters other things being equal. That is, the 
more similar products of a cluster are, the larger its output 
will be.
While the model depends on restrictive assumption 
that the similarity among a cluster(s) is used as a measure 
for clustering, it does show that it is possible for the theory 
of external economies to make at least some progress into 
this virtually unexplored territory.
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